Introduction
William Ockham (1287-1349) was lecturing on the Sentences of Petrus Lombardus between 1317 and 1319 in Oxford. At this time, Walter Chatton (ca 1285-1343) was studying theology at the same university. The careers of the two Franciscan friars developed in rather opposite directions: Ockham was excommunicated by the Church and was engaged in a battle against the pope until his death whereas Chatton assumed the function of an examiner of writings in Avignon under Popes Benedict xii and Clement vi in his last years. instance on the nature of concepts and the object of acts of judgement due to Chatton's critique.4
In this chapter, I shall present Chatton's critique of a kind of singular intellectual cognition, namely intuitive cognition that plays a central role for Ockham's epistemology insofar as he thereby explains how the process of knowledge acquisition is initiated; according to him contingent knowledge about extra-mental particulars is the first knowledge human subjects acquire at all.5 Ockham calls this kind of knowledge "evident."6 Scholars commonly agree that it is one of Ockham's major philosophical innovations to have argued for the possibility of a kind of singular intellectual cognition of particulars, very similar to sense perception.7 Chatton rejected the assumption of an intellectual intuitive cognition. He was more in line with the (traditional) view that we can cognitively grasp extra-mental particulars only with the senses. Chatton's argumentation is partly grounded on metaphysical considerations. Ockham and Chatton hold clashing views about the metaphysical structure of the soul and its powers. According to Ockham, the intellectual and the sensory powers of the human soul are ontologically distinct because the rational and the sensitive soul are two distinct entities.8 Chatton is more
